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1. Introduction 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) is currently conducting 
a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine, involving 
allegations against Israeli authorities and military personnel as well as 
what the Prosecutor refers to as “Palestinian armed groups”.1 The 
preliminary examination – opened in 2015 and currently placed in the 
so-called phase 2 where prosecutors focus on examining whether the 
requirements relating to subject-matter jurisdiction are satisfied2 – 
creates a framework for advancing accountability norms in the 
Palestinian context and globally for international crimes committed by 
States with significant (military and diplomatic) resources. However, 
the road to accountability is anything but straightforward. Indeed, 
several challenges relating both to the applicable legal framework and 
broader policy issues, could delay – or potentially even undermine – the 
accountability process, if not properly understood and managed. One 
particularly important issue addressed in this Article relates to the ICC’s 
complementarity regime whereby the Court can only proceed with cases 
that are not subject to active and genuine investigation or prosecution 
domestically.3 Whereas this principle is usually seen as something that 
intrinsically advances accountability norms, this Article questions 
                                               
* Lecturer in law at Transitional Justice Institute at Ulster University, Belfast, UK. 
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1 Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities [hereinafter OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities], 2017 §§ 
51-78. 
2 Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations (Nov. 2013), §§ 80-81. [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations] 
3 Other important issues relating to the ICC’s jurisdiction and issues of admissibility, 
including the ambiguous ‘gravity’ standard, are not addressed in this Article.  
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whether this is necessarily the case in situations involving global and 
regional powers,4 including the Palestine examination.  
 
Contextualizing the Court’s activity in Palestine to other ICC 
interventions that target global or regional powers, at the broadest level 
this Article contributes to understanding the opportunities and 
challenges associated with seeking accountability for violations 
committed by countries with significant resources. It does so by taking 
the starting point in the ICC’s preliminary examination in Palestine, and 
interrogates this process in light of the broader legal and policy issues 
that arise in situations where the Court’s interventions clash with the 
interests of such powers. In this sense, the Article aims to shed light on 
the nature and prospects of an on-going legal process with significant 
policy ramifications inside and outside of the region, including for the 
U.S.5 Beyond contributing to the understanding of key issues at play in 
                                               
4 Although there is no consensus around the concept of global and regional powers – 
and what States qualify as such – of the countries currently subject to ICC 
investigation or preliminary examination (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sudan, Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Georgia 
(including allegations against Russia), Afghanistan (including allegations against the 
U.S.), Colombia, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq (including allegations the U.K.), Nigeria, 
Palestine (including allegations against Israel), the Philippines, Ukraine (including 
allegations against Russia) and Venezuela), the U.S. is commonly considered a 
global power, whereas Russia, the U.K. and – albeit more disputed – Israel are 
commonly considered regional powers. While some would consider Nigeria a 
regional power, for the purposes of this Article it makes more sense to not consider 
Nigeria as such since it lacks the military and diplomatic capacity (or support) that 
characterizes the other countries and, arguably, provide them with unique 
opportunities in terms of influencing – and potentially countering – international 
legal processes. Of course, Israel’s ability to exercise such influence is based not only 
on its own resources, but to a considerable extent on its ability to count on U.S. 
support. For a discussion of the concept of regional powers, see e.g. Detlef Nolte, 
How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics, GER. 
INST. OF GLOBAL AFF.,  https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/212a550d-597b-
4f60-86df-ec73a8e43707.pdf. This Article uses the terms global and regional powers 
and countries with significant (military and diplomatic) resources interchangeably.   
5 Concerning policy ramifications in the U.S., see generally David Bosco, Palestine 
in The Hague: Justice, Geopolitics, and the International Criminal Court, 22 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 155 (2016) (noting at 168 that the opening an investigation 
“would set in motion intense political maneuvering by all concerned states […] The 
impact would likely be most dramatic in the United States, where Congress might 
consider new legislation limiting US support for and contact with the court.”). For a 
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the Palestine examination,6 this is important because much remains to 
be understood concerning the nature and impact of ICC preliminary 
examinations;7 how the ICC’s complementarity regime functions in 
highly sensitive political situations and more broadly the opportunities 
                                               
(pro-Israel) discussion of policy ramifications for the U.S., see Hearing before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs Subcomm. on the Middle East & N. Afr. Hearing: “The 
Palestinian Authority’s International Criminal Court Gambit: A True Partner for 
Peace?”, 114th Cong. 26-42 (2015) (written testimony of Eugene Kontrovich). 
6 A range of existing studies examine the ICC’s Palestine examination. Many of them 
do so from the perspective of the broader policy ramifications of opening – or failing 
to open – an investigation or the particular legal standards relating to jurisdiction. In 
contrast, there has been only limited engagement with issues of complementarity in 
the context of the Palestine examination. For studies addressing the Palestine 
examination, see generally Bosco, supra note 5; Adam Oler, The Looming Demise of 
the ICC’s Complementarity Principle: Israel, US Interests, and the Court’s Future, 
31 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 1001 (2017); Mohamed El Zeidy, Ad Hoc Declarations of 
Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny, in THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn ed. 2015); 
Daniel Benoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
73 (2010); Eugene Kontorovich, When Gravity Fails: Israeli Settlements and 
Admissibility at the ICC, 47 ISR. L. REV. 379 (2014); Eugene Kontorovich, 
Israel/Palestine — The ICC’s Uncharted Territory, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 979 
(2013); Yaël Ronen, Israel, Palestine and the ICC — Territory Uncharted but not 
Unknown, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 7 (2014); John Dugard, Palestine and the 
International Criminal Court: Institutional Failure or Bias?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
563 (2013). 
7 As Mark Kersten notes, “the preliminary examination stage presents a unique, if 
under-theorized, opportunity to potentially affect the behaviour of conflict and post- 
conflict actors”. See Mark Kersten, Casting a Larger Shadow: Pre-Meditated 
Madness, the International Criminal Court, and Preliminary Examinations, in 2 
QUALITY CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 655 (Morten Bergsmo and 
Carsten Stahn eds., 2018). Recently, however, international criminal law scholars 
have paid more attention to preliminary examinations. See generally the studies in 
QUALITY CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS VOL. I & II. (Morten Bergsmo 
and Carsten Stahn eds., 2018).  
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and challenges associated with pursuing accountability for crimes 
committed by States with significant resources.8 
 
The Article makes three overarching arguments which advance our 
understanding of international criminal justice, in particular 
accountability for violations by States with significant resources. First, 
whereas the ICC is increasingly scrutinizing the actions of States with 
significant resources and seems willing to proceed with investigating 
highly sensitive situations, there are substantial challenges associated 
with achieving accountability for crimes committed by such States. In 
part, this is because such have unique possibilities for creating obstacles 
to accountability and in part because the ICC legal and policy 
framework is not fully geared to handle such situations. Second, even if 
there are important variations in government responses, States with 
significant resources tend to take ICC intervention seriously, and there 
is some evidence that ICC interventions impact their behavior, although 
such change in behavior is not necessarily to the benefit of 
accountability. In part, this is because the launch of an internationally-
driven accountability process adds a level of pressure on States by virtue 
of creating increased scrutiny and awareness of violations and because 
ICC interventions – including preliminary examinations – carry with 
them stigma and entail substantial legitimacy costs for States, especially 
those that claim to generally subscribe to the international rule of law. 
This in turn creates opportunities for actors seeking to promote 
accountability norms, though such opportunities are often constrained 
by counter-action by the relevant State. Third – and related to both of 
the above arguments – despite being typically viewed as something 
inherently ‘good’ in terms of advancing accountability norms, the ICC’s 
complementarity regime often presents challenges for advancing 
accountability in situations involving States with significant resources. 
This is partly because such States have unique possibilities to utilize the 
                                               
8 However, some recent studies provide for case specific analysis of these issues. See, 
e.g., Carla Ferstman, The International Criminal Court Prosecutor's Preliminary 
Examination on Afghanistan and Possible Impacts on Accountability for Secret 
Detention and Rendition in EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: ADDRESSING THE 
CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY (Guild, Bigo, and Gibney eds., 2018); Thomas 
Obel Hansen, Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq? Examining the Nexus 
between International and National Justice Responses, in 1 QUALITY CONTROL IN 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 399 (Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn eds., 2018).  
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complementary regime in ways that are detrimental to accountability, 
including by framing and directing domestic legal processes so as to 
prolong or otherwise frustrate the pursuit of accountability for those who 
bear the greatest responsibility for international crimes. 
 
The Article proceeds by describing the background to the ICC’s 
examination in Palestine, including its legal basis, the measures taken 
by Palestine to trigger the Court’s intervention, and the current status of 
the examination. Next, the Article explains what crimes are under ICC 
scrutiny and discusses the consequences of this. While much remains 
unknown for now, one key question to consider in that regard is what 
actors are likely to be investigated – and potentially prosecuted – should 
a formal investigation be opened. The Article then proceeds to an 
analysis of the ICC’s complementarity regime, including an assessment 
of the legal and policy framework and challenges and opportunities 
associated with giving effect to its values in the Palestine case, and more 
broadly situations involving allegations against resourceful States. The 
Article concludes by considering broader policy choices associated with 
pursuing accountability for crimes by States with significant resources. 
 
2. Background and status of the ICC’s preliminary examination of 
the situation in Palestine  
 
2.1. Legal basis for the Palestine examination 
 
On 16 January 2015, ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced 
that her Office had opened a preliminary examination of the situation in 
Palestine.9 This followed a dual-action approach of the government of 
Palestine. On 1 January 2015, Palestine lodged a declaration under 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the retroactive jurisdiction 
of the ICC over crimes committed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014.10 The day after, the 
                                               
9 Press Release,  Int’l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, The Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of 
the Situation in Palestine (Jan. 16, 2015), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083 [hereinafter OTP Jan. 2015 press release]. 
10 The provision reads:  
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the 
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government made its deposition of instruments of accession to the Rome 
Statute with the UN Secretary-General. The Rome Statute entered into 
force for Palestine on 1 April 2015, but due to the Article 12(3) 
declaration the Court may exercise jurisdiction retrospectively from 13 
June 2014.11  
 
To complicate the picture further, in May 2018 Palestine submitted a 
referral under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, requesting the ICC 
Prosecutor to “investigate, in accordance with the temporal jurisdiction 
of the Court, past, ongoing and future crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction, committed in all parts of the territory of the State of 
Palestine”.12 The referral takes note of the ongoing preliminary 
examination, and argues that “given the acceleration of settlement-
related crimes and their irreversible effect on the lives of Palestinians 
and on the prospects for a lasting peace, it is imperative that the [ICC 
Prosecutor] immediately commence an investigation into the crimes 
herein referred as its highest priority”.13 The referral “specifies that the 
circumstances relevant to the present referral include but are not limited 
to, all matters related to the Israeli settlement regime”, in particular “any 
conduct, policies, laws, official decisions, and practices that underlie, 
promote, encourage or otherwise make a contribution to the commission 
                                               
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The 
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in 
accordance with Part 9.  
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(3), 17 July, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Preliminary examinations may be initiated 
by the Office of the Prosecutor either on the basis of a) information sent by 
individuals or groups, States, inter-governmental or non-governmental organizations, 
or “other reliable sources”; b) a referral from a State Party or the UN Security 
Council; or c) a declaration accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court 
pursuant to article 12(3) lodged by a State which is not a Party to the Statute. See 
OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2 §§ 73-76. 
11 Preliminary Examinations: Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/palestine.  
12 Referral by the State of Palestine Pursuant to Articles 13(A) and 14 of the Rome 
Statute (May 15, 2018) [hereinafter Referral by the State of Palestine]. See also 
Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the Referral Submitted by 
Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=180522-otp-stat [hereinafter OTP 
Statement on the Referral Submitted by Palestine]. 
13 Referral by the State of Palestine, supra note 12, § 8. 
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of these crimes”.14 While the referral does not in by itself change the 
nature or status of the preliminary examination or impose any obligation 
on the ICC Prosecutor to focus on the crimes highlighted in the referral, 
it does mean that should the Prosecutor decide that the situation in 
Palestine warrants a full investigation, her Office would not need to seek 
the authorization of the pre-trial chamber.15 Beyond these legal 
ramifications, it is worth noting that ICC interventions triggered by State 
referrals tend to take a specific direction in that they usually focus on 
actors that challenge the referring State, as opposed to members of the 
referring government itself.16 They also tend to proceed quicker, perhaps 
in part because of the enhanced cooperation offered by the referring 
State.17  
 
In this sense, the examination in Palestine sets itself apart from other 
situations involving allegations against States with significant resources 
in that the legal basis for opening a potential investigation was initially 
to be found in the Article 12(3) declaration by Palestine and 
subsequently in the referral made by Palestine. Accordingly, in this case 
a State Party to the Rome Statute is actively seeking to trigger the 
Court’s jurisdiction but that referral is intended to target a regional 
power – Israel – which is not a party to the Statute. In contrast, most 
other situations involving allegations against global and regional powers 
are based on the Prosecutor’s use of the proprio motu powers.18 This 
may turn out to be important because Palestinian authorities are 
expected to be forthcoming (as are numerous Palestinian and Israeli civil 
society organization) providing the Court with evidence and other forms 
                                               
14 Id. § 11. 
15 See Rome Statute art 15(3). See further hereinafter OTP Statement on the Referral 
Submitted by Palestine. 
16 See e.g. Thomas Obel Hansen, Reflections on the ICC Prosecutor’s Recent 
‘Selection Decisions’, 17 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 125 (2013). 
17 For an analysis of the duration of various preliminary examinations, see Sara 
Wharton and Rosemary Grey, Preliminary examinations: A closer look at one of the 
most important parts of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s work, INTLAWGRRLS 
(December 8, 2017), https://ilg2.org/2017/12/08/preliminary-examinations-a-closer-
look-at-one-of-the-most-important-parts-of-the-icc-office-of-the-prosecutors-work/. 
18 The preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine is also based on an Article 
12(3) declaration. See the Annex to this Article for an outline of how other 
preliminary examinations and investigations involving allegations against global or 
regional powers were initiated and their current status. 
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of cooperation needed to take potential cases forward, at least if they 
relate to alleged Israeli crimes.  
 
The current preliminary examination came in the wake of a previous 
unsuccessful attempt by Palestine to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICC 
over crimes in its territory. In 2012, then chief ICC Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo decided to close the preliminary examination relating 
to the situation in Palestine on the grounds that Palestine did not amount 
to a State under the Rome Statute. That decision was made on the basis 
that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) had at the time not 
recognized Palestinian statehood. The Prosecutor’s view therefore was 
that the Article 12(3) declaration submitted by Palestine in 2009 could 
not be acted on since only States can submit such declarations under the 
Rome Statute.19 What ultimately proved central to the Prosecutor’s 2015 
decision to proceed with an examination in Palestine was therefore the 
UNGA’s vote in November 2012 to recognize Palestine as a non-
member observer State.20 In turn, ICC membership supports claims for 
Palestinian statehood, even if ratification of treaties is not a formal 
criteria for assessing statehood under the Montevideo Convention.21  
 
2.2. Nature and status of the preliminary examination 
 
The Prosecutor does not enjoy full investigative powers at the 
preliminary examination stage. Rather, a preliminary examination – 
largely unregulated in the ICC’s legal framework – is primarily based 
on a review of documents and aims at determining whether there is a 
                                               
19 See OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012 (noting in § 201: “In 
interpreting and applying article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Office has assessed that 
it is for the relevant bodies at the United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to 
make the legal determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State for the purpose of 
acceding to the Rome Statute and thereby enabling the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Court under article 12(1)”). For a discussion of (the lack of) Palestinian statehood at 
the time and its ramifications for the ICC process, see Daniel Benoliel & Ronen 
Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 73 (2010).   
20 See OTP Jan. 2015 press release, supra note 9.  
21 See generally Bosco, supra note 5. See also Thomas Obel Hansen, What Are the 
Consequences of Palestine Joining the International Criminal Court?, E-
INTERNATIONAL REL. (April 2015), http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/06/what-are-the-
consequences-of-palestine-joining-the-international-criminal-court/.  
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basis for opening a formal investigation.22 According to Article 53(1) of 
the Rome Statute, in making this determination the Prosecutor shall 
consider issues of jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of 
justice.23 As noted above, the practice of the ICC Prosecutor varies 
considerably in terms of how quickly preliminary examinations proceed, 
making it difficult to predict when exactly a decision will be made to 
either take forward or terminate the Palestine examination. 
 
The Palestine examination is currently placed in the so-called phase 2, 
meaning that the Prosecutor continues to focus on assessing whether 
statutory requirements relating to subject-matter jurisdiction are 
satisfied.24 Should the Prosecutor be satisfied that there is a “reasonable 
basis to believe” that war crimes (or other crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court) have been committed, the examination will proceed to 
phase 3, during which the Prosecutor will focus on issues of 
admissibility. This includes an assessment of complementarity, whereby 
the existence of national proceedings relating to the same conduct 
                                               
22 See generally Carsten Stahn, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: 
Challenges and Critiques of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. (2017), (noting at 414 that: “The term ‘preliminary examinations’ has marginal 
importance in the Rome Statute. It appears in Article 15(6) of the Statute, and 
indirectly in Article 42. It refers broadly speaking to a phase that is ‘not yet an 
investigation’, but a ‘sort of pre-investigation carried out by the Prosecutor’”.). 
Accordingly, as David Bosco notes, the Office’s discretion is broad during this phase 
of the Court’s work and neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence offer any significant guidance on how to conduct preliminary 
examinations, although they do make clear that the prosecutor may seek additional 
information and may take oral or written testimony during this phase. See David 
Bosco, The International Criminal Court and Crime Prevention: Byproduct or 
Conscious, 19 MICH.  ST. INT’L L. REV. 163 (2011). For a description of the steps 
typically taken by the Prosecutor during preliminary examinations, see OTP Policy 
Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, §§ 85-88. 
23 For a description of how this analysis is conducted, see OTP Policy Paper on 
Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, §§ 34-71. 
24 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, § 78. Some 
observers question whether this sequencing of preliminary examinations whereby 
“analysis may get stuck at one phase, like jurisdiction, for years, without considering 
information relating to other phases” is feasible. See Carsten Stahn, supra note 22 at 
428. 
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examined by the ICC could lead to a conclusion of inadmissibility.25 
Beyond this narrow legal assessment of complementarity under Article 
53(1) (cf. Article 17) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor endorses a 
policy of promoting so-called ‘positive complementarity’, understood 
as a question of “ending of impunity, by encouraging genuine national 
proceedings”.26 As detailed below in this Article, the Prosecutor’s 
understanding of existing legal processes in Israel and Palestine – as 
well as the Office’s understanding of the potential for these to ‘improve’ 
or for new ones to occur – will likely prove decisive for whether, and if 
so when, the Palestine examination proceeds to a full investigation.  
 
Meanwhile, the Prosecutor’s reports on preliminary examinations imply 
that the assessment of subject-matter jurisdiction is not straightforward. 
Indeed, the most recent report on preliminary examination activities of 
November 2017 suggests that the Prosecutor remains uncertain whether 
a range of legal requirements relating to subject-matter jurisdiction are 
satisfied in the Palestine situation. Two specific issues are highlighted 
in the 2017 report on preliminary examinations, which could prove 
crucial for the Office’s determination of whether the Court has subject 
matter jurisdiction, and thus whether it will proceed to phase 3 of the 
examination and potentially a full investigation.  
 
One issue relates to the legal regime applicable to the situation in the 
West Bank. In the 2017 report on preliminary examinations, the 
Prosecutor notes that multiple sources, including the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), have 
held that the West Bank and East Jerusalem should be considered 
occupied territory. However, the Prosecutor also takes note of the Israeli 
view that the area should be seen as “disputed territory”, subject to 
competing claims, which should result in the rejection of the “de jure 
application of the Geneva Conventions to the territory”.27  
 
Another key issue relates to the legal characterization of the Gaza 
conflict. The 2017 report on preliminary examinations notes:  
                                               
25 For a description of the assessments undertaken in phase 3, including with respect 
to complementarity, gravity and the concept of ‘interest of justice’, see generally 
OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, §§ 42-71.   
26 Id. § 93. See further infra Section 5. 
27 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, § 69.  
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The appropriate legal characterisation of the conflict presents several 
difficulties in light of the sui generis nature of the conflict. While most agree 
on the existence of an armed conflict, the classification of the conflict as one 
of an international or non-international character, or both existing in parallel, 
remains subject to significant debate and diverging views. […] The 
classification of the 2014 Gaza conflict has an impact on the Office’s analysis 
of particular crimes allegedly committed during the 2014 conflict. While a 
number of crimes of possible relevance to the situation are substantially 
similar in the context both of international and non-international armed 
conflicts, certain war crimes provisions under the Statute appear to be 
applicable to international armed conflicts only.28  
 
These are unusually transparent – some would say uncertain – 
comments for the Office to make in reports on preliminary examinations 
regarding its understanding of key legal issues. However, it may well be 
that these comments should partly be seen as a diplomatic exercise by 
the Prosecutor to demonstrate that Israel’s views are being duly 
considered.29 
 
                                               
28 Id. § 70. It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage the debate as to whether 
Gaza should be considered occupied territory, but see generally Hanne Cuyckens, Is 
Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?, 63 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 275 (2016) 
(concluding that: “the effective control test at the core of the law of occupation is 
no longer met and hence Gaza is no longer occupied, but given that Israel 
nevertheless continues to exercise some degree of control over Gaza and its 
population, the absence of occupation does not mean the absence of accountability. 
This responsibility is however not founded on the law of occupation but on general 
international humanitarian law, potentially complemented by international human 
rights law”.) See further David Bosco, supra note 5, at 161. 
29 The author has no specific evidence this is the case, but as Carsten Stahn notes, 
“preliminary examinations often involve a large degree of diplomacy”. See Carsten 
Stahn, supra note 22, at 418. Research into the behavior of the ICC prosecutors in 
situations involving global and regional powers suggest that whereas prosecutors 
may well in principle be committed to applying the same standards to such 
examinations as it applies to others, they are also sensitive to the ramifications of 
examining such powers and hence carefully consider any action and statements they 
make in such examinations. This research also suggests that the policy objective of 
promoting positive complementarity is a central concern of prosecutors in this 
regard. See generally Thomas Obel Hansen, supra note 8. 
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3. Crimes and actors under ICC scrutiny in the Palestine 
examination, and implications from a complementarity 
perspective  
 
To understand the opportunities and challenges seeking accountability 
for crimes in Palestine under the ICC’s complementarity regime, it is 
necessary to set out the focus of the ICC’s preliminary examination, 
including the crimes and actors currently under scrutiny. 
 
3.1. Crimes currently under scrutiny 
 
The ICC examination focuses on only a relatively limited – albeit 
important – range of crimes. Specifically, the examination currently 
involves an assessment of: 1) settlements activities authorized by Israeli 
authorities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and 2) crimes allegedly 
committed by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) as well as Palestinian 
armed groups during the conflict in Gaza between 7 July and 26 August 
2014 (‘the 2014 Gaza conflict’).30  
 
The situation in Palestine is similar to most other ICC situations 
targeting the conduct of global and regional powers in that it focuses on 
crimes alleged committed by both parties to a conflict.31 However, it sets 
itself apart from other such interventions in that one category of crimes 
under scrutiny relates to a State-sanctioned policy of settlements and 
transfer of population.32 Even if allegations against British and U.S. 
armed forces and the CIA suggest that crimes were committed 
systematically and with some form of policy approval, in no other 
situation involving a State with significant resources has the Court 
focused explicitly on conduct which if investigated would almost with 
certainty lead the Prosecutor to examine individual criminal 
responsibility of the country’s senior most officials and decision-
makers.33 This helps understand Israel’s response to the ICC 
                                               
30 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, §§ 58-66. 
31 The situation in Iraq stands out in this regard, as it involves allegations against one 
actor only, namely British service personnel. See the Annex to this Article.  
32 See the Annex to this Article. 
33 See also David Bosco, How to Avoid Getting Hauled before The Hague, FOREIGN 
POL. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/01/how-to-avoid-getting-
hauled-before-the-hague-palestine-international-criminal-court/.   
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intervention, discussed further below in this Article. 
 
How then is the ICC Prosecutor describing the conduct subject to 
analysis in the preliminary examination? Details regarding wording 
matter in the context of the Prosecutor’s reporting on preliminary 
examinations, and there are some notable changes in the Prosecutor’s 
assessments in the most recent (November 2017) report on preliminary 
examinations. For one, previous reports explicitly cited to allegations of 
crimes committed by Hamas,34 but the 2017 report speaks only in more 
generic terms about crimes allegedly committed by “Palestinian armed 
groups”.35 This is an unusual turn which could suggest that this aspect 
of the examination is not moving forward as ‘normal’ (if there is 
anything such as ‘normal’ in the context of preliminary examinations), 
since the Prosecutor tends to be more specific concerning the actors 
allegedly responsible for the crimes examined as the preliminary 
examination proceeds.36  
 
At the same time, it is noteworthy that the 2017 report provides 
additional details concerning alleged crimes relating to Israeli settlement 
activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Importantly, the report 
suggests that the preliminary examination now specifically covers 
political actors at the highest level, noting that “[i]n March 2017, for the 
first time in decades, Israel’s security cabinet reportedly approved the 
construction of an entirely new settlement”.37 Leaving aside here the 
legal and diplomatic obstacles associated with pursuing accountability 
for incumbent political leaders, this sends a strong message to the Israeli 
leadership that decisions relating to settlement activities are being 
scrutinized from the perspective of individual criminal accountability. 
What is more, the 2017 report cites to UNSC Resolution 2334 of 23 
December 2016, which reaffirmed the occupied status of the West Bank, 
                                               
34 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, supra note 1, § 125. 
35 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, § 66. 
36 By way of example, in the preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan, 
the Prosecutor initially referred to acts of torture by “various parties to the conflict”, 
but later publicly identified specific actors as alleged perpetrators, including U.S. 
armed forces and the CIA. Compare OTP Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 2011 § 26 with OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, 
supra note 1, § 255. 
37 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, § 61. 
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and explicitly condemned the “construction and expansion of 
settlements, transfer of Israeli settlers, confiscation of land, demolition 
of homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians, in violation of 
international humanitarian law and relevant resolutions”.38 Some 
commentators believe this should be seen to suggest that the Prosecutor 
“may feel freer than ever before to treat Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank as war crimes”.39 What seems clear is that the UNSC resolution 
adds substantial legitimacy to a potential finding by the Prosecutor that 
the settlement activities amount to a crime that can be prosecuted under 
the ICC Statute. It could also make further ICC scrutiny of these actions 
less likely to be subject to the condemnation – or at least deliberate 
obstruction – of permanent members of the UNSC, although some of 
these members, including the U.S., will almost certainly not condone 
that the ICC investigates Israeli settlements.40  
 
3.2. Monitoring of other crimes and government responses 
 
Even if other reported crimes – including more recent ones – do not 
currently form part of the preliminary examination, the ICC Prosecutor 
continues to monitor developments in Palestine. Notably, on 8 April 
2018, Prosecutor Bensouda issued a statement, noting that “[i]t is with 
                                               
38 Id. § 69. Demonstrating how political leaders seek to instrumentalize the legal 
process, following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2334, Palestinian authorities 
immediately advocated for the opening of a full investigation, calling on the ICC 
Prosecutor “to expedite her initial examination into settlements and subsequently 
proceed to opening a full investigation, now that the UNSC has established that they 
are illegal.” See Adam Ragson &  Yonah Jeremy Bob, Following UNSC Resolution, 
PLO Wants ICC to Open Full Investigation Into Settlements, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 
28, 2016.  
39 See Yonah Jeremy Bob, Four main take-aways from ICC report on Israel-
Palestinians, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 4, 2017. 
40 The Trump administration’s views on the examination of the situation in Palestine 
are not necessarily clear at the time of writing, but it is worth recalling that President 
Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton is a fierce opponent of the ICC and 
that the administration has often taken a more pro-Israeli stand on key issues 
compared to previous U.S. administrations. See generally John B. Bellinger III, The 
International Criminal Court and the Trump Administration, COUNCIL ON FOR. 
REL. (March, 2018),  https://www.cfr.org/blog/international-criminal-court-and-
trump-administration; Adam Entous, Donald Trump’s new world order, THE NEW 
YORKER , June 18, 2018), available at 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order.  
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grave concern that I note the violence and deteriorating situation in the 
Gaza Strip in the context of recent mass demonstrations”.41 The 
Prosecutor further observed that since 30 March 2018, “at least 27 
Palestinians have been reportedly killed by the Israeli Defence Forces, 
with over a thousand more injured, many, as a result of shootings using 
live ammunition and rubber-bullets”, which “could constitute crimes 
under the Rome Statute”, “as could the use of civilian presence for the 
purpose of shielding military activities.”42 The Prosecutor reminded all 
parties that the situation in Palestine is under preliminary examination, 
emphasizing that “any new alleged crime committed in the context of 
the situation in Palestine may be subjected to my Office’s scrutiny”.43  
 
The Prosecutor’s statement was widely reported on in Israeli, 
Palestinian and international media.44 Prior to the Prosecutor’s 
statement, Palestinian foreign minister Riyad al-Malki had submitted a 
letter to the Prosecutor in which he denounced the “escalation of 
unlawful practices by Israel” in Gaza and called on the ICC to “stop 
Israel violating international laws in respect of children that may amount 
to a violation of Israel’s obligations”.45 Hours after the Prosecutor issued 
her statement, the IDF leadership announced that it would launch an 
inquiry into the conduct of its troops in the recent incidents in Gaza.46 
                                               
41 See Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, regarding the worsening situation in Gaza, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFFICE OF 
THE PROSECUTOR (8 April, 2018), https://www.icc-
cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=180408-otp-stat. [hereinafter OTP statement 
regarding the worsening situation in Gaza].  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 See, e.g., Israeli Army Orders Investigation of its Response to Gaza Border 
Protests, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (8 Apr. 2018), 
https://www.jta.org/2018/04/08/news-opinion/idf-orders-investigation-militarys-
response-gaza-border-protests; Owen Bowcott, Chief ICC Lawyer Calls for End to 
Violence Along Gaza Border, THE GUARDIAN (8 Apr. 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/chief-icc-lawyer-calls-for-end-to-
violence-along-gaza-border.  
45 As cited in Palestinians appeal to ICC to halt alleged Israeli crimes, THE TIMES OF 
ISR. (20 Jan. 2018), available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinians-appeals-
to-icc-to-halt-alleged-israeli-crimes/.  
46 See also Israel to Probe Gaza Border Deaths Avoiding International Investigation, 
ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (10 Apr. 2018), 
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Leaving aside for now whether this is likely to be a credible inquiry, the 
IDF’s announcement suggests that Israeli authorities are closely 
monitoring and appear to take seriously ICC activities. Previously, in 
January 2018, Israel’s National Security Council warned members of 
the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the ICC was 
likely to soon move from the examination to the investigation phase with 
respect to alleged Israeli crimes.47  
 
Israel’s response to the ICC’s activity in Palestine has varied over time. 
The most aggressive responses include making efforts to prevent 
Palestine from joining the ICC; labelling the Court as “anti-Israeli”; 
stating it will demand from its allies that they stop funding the Court; 
and making it clear that it will take action to “dismantle” the ICC.48 
However, The Israeli government has more recently used a more 
conciliatory tone towards the ICC, including opening a ‘dialogue’ with 
the Prosecutor and helped facilitate a visit of her Office to Israel and 
Palestine in October 2016 involving outreach and education activities.49 
                                               
https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1232846/israel-probe-gaza-border-deaths-
avoiding-international-investigation.  
47 Alan Baker notes that the report states that the “opening of an investigation has 
serious implications for Israel”, but also “refers to differing views within Israel’s 
justice and foreign affairs ministries as to the seriousness of this issue, it holds that 
these ministries nevertheless view the matter with concern and appreciate the need to 
deal with it at the legal and political levels to remove the threat”. Alan Baker also notes 
that it is “unclear if the fears of the Israeli National Security Council are based on solid 
information emanating from the Office of the ICC Prosecutor, or merely on 
conjecture”. See Alan Baker, Palestinian Manipulation of the International Criminal 
Court, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR INT’L AFF. (21 Jan. 2018), http://jcpa.org/will-the-
international-criminal-court-disregard-international-law/.  
48 For an outline of Israeli government behavior and statements, see generally Mark 
Kersten, In Its Fight Against the ICC, Israel Takes a Page Out of John 
Bolton’s Playbook, JUST. IN CONFLICT (20 Jan. 2015), 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/01/20/in-its-fight-against-the-icc-israel-takes-a-
page-out-of-john-boltons-playbook/; Mark Kersten, The International Criminal 
Court Can and Should Investigate Violence in Gaza, JUST. IN CONFLICT (17 May, 
2018), https://justiceinconflict.org/2018/05/17/the-international-criminal-court-can-
and-should-investigate-violence-in-gaza/.  
49 See Israel ‘Engaging’ with ICC over Gaza War Crimes Inquiry: Prosecutor, 
REUTERS (3 June 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-icc-
idUSKCN0YP1CT. See also OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 
2016, supra note 1, § 143; Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Fatou Bensouda, ahead of the Office’s visit to Israel and Palestine from 5 to 
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Yet, as detailed below in this Article, this change in attitude towards the 
ICC does not appear to be accompanied by any substantial change in 
terms of its approach to domestic inquiries into crimes under the ICC’s 
examination. 
 
In simpler terms, the ICC process impacts decision-makers in Israel and 
Palestine, although – as discussed in more detail below in this Article – 
it is far from certain this will prove to be an example of what prosecutors 
refer to as positive complementarity.   
 
3.3. What actors are likely to be subject to a potential investigation? 
 
Should the preliminary examination proceed to a full investigation, what 
actors are then most likely to be the focus of such an investigation? 
Some commentators suggest that the Prosecutor may be inclined, at least 
in the first place, to pursue only members of Hamas for rocket attacks 
on civilians, because these “would be by far the easiest of all the crimes 
to prosecute” and because it may be seen by the Prosecutor as politically 
more feasible.50 In the view of this author, the Prosecutor would be well 
advised to pursue both Palestinian and Israeli actors, including those 
responsible for unlawful settlements.  
 
First, an exclusive focus on crimes by one actor only would almost 
certainly lead to a new backlash against the Prosecutor for being biased 
– and should this be Palestinian armed groups, criticism for targeting 
                                               
10 October 2016, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR (5 Oc. 2016) 
(emphasizing that the purpose of the visit was to “undertake outreach and education 
activities” , but not to “engage in evidence collection in relation to any alleged 
crimes”; “undertake site visits”; or “assess the adequacy of the respective legal 
systems to deal with crimes that fall within ICC jurisdiction.”).  
50 See Kevin Heller, The ICC in Palestine: Be Careful What You Wish For, JUST. IN 
CONFLICT 2 Apr. 2015), https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/04/02/the-icc-in-palestine-
be-careful-what-you-wish-for/.  
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less resourceful parties to conflicts.51 This could easily undermine 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the ICC’s intervention in Palestine – 
and the legitimacy of the Court more broadly – among crucial audiences, 
including civil society groups and academia.  
 
Second, there would be significant symbolic value in pursuing Israeli 
violations, in particular settlement activities, as international crimes. It 
is widely acknowledged that settlements have a severe impact on the 
Palestinian people as a whole and the prospects for a resolution of the 
conflict.52 Other efforts to condemn and put a stop to unlawful Israeli 
settlement policies and practices, including UNSC resolutions, have so 
far proven unsuccessful.53 Adding the dimension of international 
criminalization would signal clearly the level of international outrage of 
Israel’s decision to continue and expand settlements in blatant violation 
of international law. In the best event, it could also create a level of 
deterrence. Although the capacity of the ICC to deter international 
crimes is widely disputed,54 the opening of a formal investigation that 
covers settlement activities is likely to at least make Israeli decision-
makers consider the ramifications of being indicted by an international 
                                               
51 For an example of such criticism, see William Schabas, The Banality of International 
Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 545 (2013). Specifically concerning the failure of the 
ICC to so far proceed with an investigation in Palestine, see John Dugard, Palestine 
and the International Criminal Court: Institutional Failure or Bias? 11 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 563 (2013). For a more general account of the difficult selection decisions facing 
the ICC, see Daryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the ICC Cannot Win, 28 
LEIDEN J. INT’L CRIM. L. (2015). 
52 See e.g. Rachelle Marshall, Israeli Settlements Come at a High Price, 35 WASH. 
REP. ON MIDDLE EAST AFF. (2016). 
53 See e.g. UN Security Council, Meeting coverage: Settlement Expansion, Jerusalem 
Embassy Decision Eroding Prospects for Peace in Middle East, Special Coordinator 
Tells Security Council (26 March 2018), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13263.doc.htm.  
54 On the capacity of the ICC to deter, see generally Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, 
Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 191 
(2010); Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International 
Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 251 (2001); James F. Alexander, The 
International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the 
Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009); David Whippman, Atrocities, 
Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 473 
(1999-2000); Jo, H., & Simmons, B., Can the International Criminal Court Deter 
Atrocity? INT’L ORG. 70 (2016) 443. 
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court.  
 
Third, as settlement activities are endorsed as a matter of State policy, 
they would be relatively straightforward to prove, at least in terms of 
facts pointing to their occurrence and official authorization.55 One 
common barrier in prosecuting international crimes committed by States 
with significant resources is that plans or policies authorizing or 
condoning the crimes are typically not written down, making it hard to 
find ‘smoking guns’. For example, one key challenge advancing 
accountability for those most responsible for detainee abuse by UK 
forces in Iraq is that such crimes appear to have taken place on the basis 
of an institutionally embedded informal system which is apparently not 
revealed by any written trail.56 Accordingly, the ICC Prosecutor may 
have easier access to certain forms of evidence in the situation in 
Palestine, compared to other situations covering global and regional 
powers. 
 
Finally, because settlement activities are not subject to any criminal 
justice inquiry domestically, for reasons set out below in this Article, 
pursuing this category of crimes would pose far fewer challenges for the 
ICC under the complementarity regime compared to other reported 
crimes in the Palestine situation. 
 
Of course, any move by the ICC to investigate and potentially prosecute 
Israeli officials responsible for settlement activities would bring the 
Court into a direct confrontation with Israel (and potentially some of its 
key allies, including the U.S.), which may prove difficult for Court 
officials to manage. Yet, recent moves by the Prosecutor suggest her 
Office is entering new territory and has become increasingly willing to 
directly challenge the interests of global and regional powers. Notably, 
in late 2017, the Prosecutor almost simultaneously decided to proceed 
to phase 3 of the examination in Iraq covering war crimes allegedly 
committed by British service personnel and requested the Chamber’s 
authorization to open an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan 
                                               
55 As noted above, the 2017 report on preliminary examination activities takes note 
that Israel’s security cabinet has reportedly approved the construction of new 
settlements, something that would be straightforward to prove. See OTP Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, § 61.  
56 See further Thomas Obel Hansen, supra note 8. 
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covering war crimes allegedly committed by U.S. armed forces and the 
CIA.57 This does obviously not mean that the ICC will ultimately 
succeed holding to account military commanders or officials of Western 
powers, but it does suggest that an escalation of the ICC’s intervention 
in Palestine, including a formal investigation of Israeli settlement 
activities, may not be as far-fetched as many observers seem to think.58 
How the Prosecutor proceeds in the other situations relating to global 
and regional powers in terms of prioritizing investigation of military 
commanders and State officials will be carefully watched in Israel as it 
could set a precedence for how prosecutors will proceed in the Palestine 
examination. 
 
Taken together, the above indicates that should a formal investigation 
be opened it is likely to focus on both Palestinian and Israeli actors, 
including those responsible for authorizing the highly controversial 
settlement activities. As will be discussed in the following, this has 
significant ramifications for how the ICC’s complementarity regime 
could play out in the Palestine situation. 
 
4. The legal assessment of complementarity  
 
Should the Prosecutor ultimately conclude that the ICC has subject-
matter jurisdiction over crimes in Palestine and proceed to the next 
phase of the examination, how then would the Office approach the 
                                               
57 See OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra note 1, § 203; 
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Requests 
Judicial Authorisation to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFFICE OF THE  PROSECUTOR (20 
November 2017), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=171120-otp-stat-afgh (hereinafter ‘OTP Afghanistan 
investigation request’). For a discussion of the prospects of bringing cases against US 
armed forces and the CIA, see also Thomas Obel Hansen, International Criminal 
Court Indictments of US officials are not Impossible, JUST SECURITY (5 January 
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/50638/international-criminal-court-indictment-
u-s-officials-impossible/.  
58 For an example of such skepticism, see Kevin Heller, The ICC in Palestine: Be 
Careful What You Wish For, JUST. IN CONFLICT (2 April 2015), 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/04/02/the-icc-in-palestine-be-careful-what-you-
wish-for/. See also Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 6.  
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assessment of complementarity and what should be the outcome of this 
assessment?  
 
4.1. Complementarity assessment at the preliminary examination stage 
 
The principle of complementarity is enshrined in Article 17(1)(a) of the 
Rome Statute, which provides that:  
 
The Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: The case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.  
 
Importantly, the Appeals Chamber has endorsed a distinction according 
to which Article 17 must be applied differently depending on the stage 
of the ICC proceedings.59 At the preliminary stages where the Rome 
Statute speaks of a ‘situation’ as opposed to a ‘case’,60 and when the 
suspects have not yet been (publicly) identified, the Appeals Chamber 
has noted that the inadmissibility test should be based on the question of 
whether the relevant State is investigating the “same overall conduct” 
which is being examined by the ICC.61 In contrast, when a full 
investigation at ICC level is launched, domestic proceedings must 
“cover the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged 
in the proceedings before the Court”.62  
 
The Prosecutor’s policy paper on preliminary examination states that the 
Office’s assessment of complementarity at the preliminary examination 
                                               
59 As such, the Appeals Chamber has noted that Article 17 applies to the 
determination of admissibility at the preliminary stages under Articles 15 and 18 of 
the Rome Statute (and the Prosecutor’s decision under Article 53(1)) as well as the 
determination of admissibility under Article 19 where a suspect or a state with 
jurisdiction challenges the admissibility of a specific case. See e.g. Prosecutor v 
Muthaura (Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the Decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute’) (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 
August 2011) ¶ 37 (hereinafter ‘Muthaura Appeal Decision’]  
60 See Rome Statute arts 13–15, 18.  
61 See e.g. Muthaura Appeal Decision, supra note 59, ¶ 38.  
62 Id., ¶ 39. 
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stage focuses on “potential cases that would likely arise from an 
investigation into the situation”, defined by factors such as:  
 
(i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an 
investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the incidents 
that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping 
the future case(s).63  
 
This is significant because States cannot avoid the opening of an ICC 
investigation by simply investigating and/ or prosecuting any crime or 
persons relating to the overall conduct examined by the ICC; it needs to 
be the specific persons and crimes that are subject to the Prosecutor’s 
scrutiny. Because it is often unclear to the public and the affected State 
who exactly these persons are at the preliminary examination stage, this 
may complicate efforts by States – both those genuinely committed to 
accountability and those not – to avoid the opening of an ICC 
investigation with reference to the complementarity regime. Turned 
around, the limited transparency offered by this framework means that 
the ICC Prosecutor is in reality left with a significant amount of 
discretion, which may, at least in theory, be used to promote 
accountability domestically with reference to the policy objective of 
positive complementarity.64  
 
4.2. ‘Inactivity’? 
 
Chambers of the Court have established that the determination of 
complementarity must rely on a two-fold test whereby any assessment 
of unwillingness or inability takes place only if it has first been 
established that there is relevant investigatory or prosecutorial activity 
                                               
63 OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, § 43.  
64 Unlike later stages, the determination of admissibility at the preliminary 
examination stage rests with the Prosecutor with no possibilities for judicial review, 
resulting that States subject to scrutiny on the basis of a referral under Article 14 of 
the Statute cannot avoid the opening of an investigation if the Prosecutor determines 
that the admissibility standards are met. Questions of admissibility at later stages are 
decided by Chambers of the Court, either on their own motion or at the request of the 
accused or the affected State. See Rome Statute arts 18(2) and 19. 
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in the State concerned.65 Chambers of the Court have made it clear that 
such activity can only be said to exist if investigations at the national 
level are ongoing, as opposed to some future planned or scheduled 
investigations.66 Further, Chambers have clarified that it is insufficient 
for a State with jurisdiction over the crimes to merely claim that there is 
an ongoing investigation. Instead, there must be “concrete evidence of 
such steps”.67  
 
Should there be a total absence of any investigatory or prosecutorial 
activity domestically – as is the case with respect to Israeli settlement 
activities68 as well as alleged Palestinian crimes during the 2014 Gaza 
conflict69 – the conclusion would, at least as a matter of principle, seem 
                                               
65 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment on the Appeal 
against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility 
of the Case ¶ 78 (25 September 2009). 
66 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-96, Decision on the Application 
by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute ¶  59 (30 May 2011). 
67 See e.g. Id., ¶ 60 (whereas the Chamber held that “a State that challenges the 
admissibility of a case bears the burden of proof to show that the case is 
inadmissible”, this does self-evidently not apply at the preliminary examination 
stage). 
68 There has been some legal activity relating to settlement issues, but this has not 
taken the form of criminal investigations and prosecutions of those responsible for 
authorizing and implementing the settlement regime as such. Israel’s Supreme Court 
has refused to entertain the matter of whether the settlement regime is lawful. As 
David Bosco notes, whereas Palestinian groups and Israeli human rights advocates 
regularly challenge Israeli occupation practices in court, “for all its independence, the 
top Israeli court has repeatedly avoided the question of whether Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank are legal”. See David Bosco, supra note 33  (further noting that “[i]n a 
series of cases, the Supreme Court has punted, deciding that settlements are a 
political question that should be resolved through international negotiations” and that 
“In the case of the settlements, the court has issued countless rulings on the legality 
of individual settler homes, and sometimes even entire settlements, but it has 
consistently refused to adjudicate the legality of the broader policy of creating 
settlements themselves under international law”). On the Israeli legal processes, see 
also David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of 
Israel, 94(885) INT’L REV. RED CROSS 207 (2012).  
69 Human Rights Watch notes that the Palestinian Authority government in the West 
Bank and Hamas in Gaza are not known to have carried out any investigations of 
alleged war crimes committed by Palestinian armed groups, including the deliberate 
or indiscriminate firing on civilians in Israel. See Human Rights Watch, Palestine: 
  24 
straightforward: The ICC Prosecutor can only conclude that there 
remains a situation of ‘inactivity’, and on this basis proceed to a full 
investigation (if finding that other Statutory requirements are satisfied). 
However, as discussed below in this Article, even in such situations the 
policy objective of positive complementarity may lead the ICC 
Prosecutor to ‘delay’ such a finding if the Office perceives there is a 
possibility that such domestic legal activity may be activated by other 
action taken by the Office or for other reasons. It is certainly a possibility 
that the Palestine examination will remain an examination for years to 
come with the Prosecutor making some form of reference to positive 
complementarity,70 even if, as this Article argues, this is not a policy 
choice that will advance accountably in the Palestine situation.   
 
Where some form of investigatory or prosecutorial activity relating to 
the crimes under ICC examination exists – as is the case for alleged 
Israeli crimes committed during the 2014 Gaza conflict – the OTP’s 
analysis is less straightforward. In such situations, one factor relevant to 
the ICC Prosecutor’s assessment of ‘activity’ is whether there is an 
“absence of an adequate legislative framework”.71 Israel’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs emphasizes that the system for investigating alleged 
crimes by Israel’s armed forces is impartial, complies with international 
standards and “compares favourably with the investigative mechanisms 
of other democratic countries”.72 Independent observers tend to be more 
                                               
ICC Should Open Formal Probe (June 5, 2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/palestine-icc-should-open-formal-probe. 
70 See also David Bosco, supra note 5 (noting at 166 that the “preliminary 
examination will almost certainly be a slow, deliberate process”, emphasizing that 
the ongoing Israeli investigations of its own conduct may provide the ICC Prosecutor 
a “reason to delay a final decision”).  
71 This includes among other issues an assessment of “the existence of laws that 
serve as a bar to domestic proceedings, such as amnesties, immunities or statutes of 
limitation”. See OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations supra note 2, § 48. 
72 The Ministry states:  
Israel maintains a multi-layered investigations system, with numerous checks and 
balances to ensure impartiality before investigative, administrative, and judicial 
authorities. Israel's military justice system, and its procedures for investigating 
possible violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, are continually reviewed and 
updated. The three main components of the military justice system are the 
Military Advocate General's Corps (“MAG Corps”), the Military Police Criminal 
Investigation Division (“MPCID”), and the independent Military Courts. 
Moreover, Israel's military justice system is subject to civilian oversight by the 
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critical. Notably, the UN Commission of Inquiry expresses concern 
about “a number of procedural, structural and substantive shortcomings, 
which continue to compromise Israel’s ability to adequately fulfil its 
duty to investigate”.73 Whereas the Commission notes the steps taken by 
Israel towards bringing its system of investigations into compliance with 
international standards, it emphasizes that flaws remain with respect to 
the State’s “adherence to international standards” and concludes that 
“significant changes are required to ensure that Israel adequately fulfils 
its duty to investigate, prosecute and hold perpetrators accountable for 
violations of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law”.74 Israel’s State Comptroller similarly points to shortcomings 
in the legal framework.75 Yet, it is not particularly likely that the ICC 
                                               
Attorney General of Israel, and subject to judicial review by Israel's Supreme 
Court, which has adopted doctrines of standing and justiciability that readily 
allow for petitions regarding IDF activity. In 2010, the Government of Israel 
created an independent public commission of inquiry headed by a former Justice 
of Israel's Supreme Court and that included distinguished international legal 
observers (the “Turkel Commission”). Following a comprehensive review, the 
Turkel Commission concluded in 2013 that Israel's mechanisms for examining 
and investigating complaints and claims of violations of the Law of Armed 
Conflict generally comply with its obligations under international law, and made 
a number of recommendations to improve these mechanisms further. The Turkel 
Commission also found that Israel's system compares favourably with the 
investigative mechanisms of other democratic countries, including Australia, 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
See ISR. MINISTRY OF FOR. AFF., Israel's Investigation of Alleged Violations of the 
Law of Armed Conflict (14 June 2015), 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/Israel-Investigation-
of-Alleged-Violations-of-Law-of-Armed-Conflict.aspx.  
73 UN Commission of Inquiry, Report of the detailed findings of the independent 
commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-
21/1, A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (24 June 2015) § 618 (hereinafter Report of the detailed 
findings of the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human 
Rights Council resolution S-21/1]. 
74 Id.  ¶ 662. 
75 An investigation launched by the State Comptroller in January 2015 and published 
in March 2018 noted that Israel’s legislation concerning war crimes is not fully in 
line with international law; that the IDF’s reporting procedure only covers deliberate 
attacks on civilians (and hence not all war crimes); and that the IDF has no effective 
investigation policy of allegations of war crimes. See State Comptroller, Operation 
‘Protective Edge’: IDF Activity from the Perspective of International Law, 
Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination and Oversight of Civilian 
and Military Echelons (March 2018), available at 
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Prosecutor will conclude there is a situation of inactivity on the basis 
that Israel’s legal framework is inadequate. The Office has never made 
such a determination in any situation under examination to date, and 
Israel, with its comparatively sophisticated legal system, is not an 
obvious candidate to become the first country to be subject to such a 
judgment.76 
 
Another factor, which could prove decisive to the ICC Prosecutor’s 
assessment of ‘activity’ with respect to the allegations surrounding the 
2014 Gaza conflict, is whether there is a “deliberate focus of 
proceedings on low-level or marginal perpetrators despite evidence on 
those more responsible”.77 In some situations, the Office observed that 
it is not sufficient that a limited number of direct physical perpetrators 
were prosecuted where evidence points to systematic crimes, and on that 
basis proceeded to request the Chamber’s authorization of an 
investigation.78 Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that “Israel is 
aware of allegations that certain IDF actions during the 2014 Gaza 
Conflict violated international law [and] Israel reviews complaints and 
other information it receives suggesting IDF misconduct, regardless of 
the source, and is committed to investigating fully any credible 
accusation or reasonable suspicion of a serious violation of the Law of 
Armed Conflict.”79 Whereas Israel has conducted various inquires and 
investigations into the actions of members of its armed forces during the 
                                               
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/palestine-icc-should-open-formal-probe. 
[hereinafter 2018 report by State Comptroller] 
76 As David Bosco notes: “Israel has an active, respected, and independent judiciary 
that is unique in the region. Its Supreme Court, in particular, enjoys a strong 
international reputation and has several times challenged sensitive government 
policies, including in the occupied territories.” See David Bosco, supra note 33.   
77 Besides the two factors cited here, the Prosecutor also refers to “other, more 
general issues related to the lack of political will or judicial capacity”. See OTP 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, § 48. 
78 For example, with respect to domestic accountability processes covering members 
of the Afghan authorities, the Office implies that in light of the allegations of 
widespread ill-treatment of detainees, it does not view it as sufficient that authorities 
have prosecuted only two National Directorate of Security officials. See OTP Report 
on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016 § 217. 
79 See ISR. MINISTRY OF FOR. AFF., Israel's Investigation of Alleged Violations of the 
Law of Armed Conflict (14 June 2015), 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/Israel-Investigation-of-
Alleged-Violations-of-Law-of-Armed-Conflict.aspx.. 
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2014 Gaza conflict, the scope of these investigations is limited and they 
appear to focus exclusively on low-level perpetrators.80 In a June 2016 
report, Human Rights Watch observed that there had been no 
“meaningful progress in providing justice for serious laws-of-war 
violations during the 2014 conflict”, emphasizing that “whereas Israeli 
military inquiries into the 2014 Gaza hostilities are ongoing, thus far 
only two soldiers have been charged with looting about US$600 from a 
Palestinian home and a third with covering it up”.81 In January 2018, an 
Israeli military court convicted one additional soldier of manslaughter 
for what Amnesty International reports was an “an apparent 
extrajudicial execution”, and sentenced him to 18 months in prison.82 In 
August 2018, the IDF closed its largest investigation into incidents 
relating to the 2014 Gaza conflict, known as the ‘Black Friday probe’, 
without recommending that any charges be brought.83 The report by the 
                                               
80 Levy and Rozenzweig note that Israel’s Military Advocate General Corps has 
received about 100 communications regarding “irregular events” during the 2014 
Gaza conflict, which were forwarded to the new General Staff investigative 
apparatus (used for the first time in connection with this operation) for further 
investigation, and that, additionally, the Military Advocate General opened 19 
criminal investigations against soldiers who were suspected of violations of the laws 
of warfare, but “not a single soldier has been tried, not even at the disciplinary 
hearing level”. See Bar Levy and Shir Rozenzweig, Israel and the International 
Criminal Court: A Legal Battlefield, 19 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT (2016). For the 
official description of the General Staff Mechanism for Fact-Finding Assessments 
(the ‘FFA Mechanism’), which examines “exceptional incidents that occurred 
during Operation Protective Edge”, see Israel Under Fire: Operation Protective 
Edge, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOR. AFF. 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/IDF-investigating-
exceptional-incidents-from-Operation-Protective-Edge-10-Sep-2014.aspx. For a 
more optimistic account of the Israeli accountability efforts, see Adam Oler, supra 
note 6, at 1008 (arguing that it is “imperative to recognize the extensive and 
substantial steps taken by the Israelis themselves to investigate alleged crimes by 
Operation Protective Edge participant”). 
81 Human Rights Watch, supra note 7.  
82 See Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories 2017/18, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-
africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-
palestinian-territories/.  
83 See IDF closes largest war crime probe of 2014 Gaza war, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 
15,  2018,  available at  https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/IDF-closes-largest-war-
crimes-probe-of-2014-Gaza-war-564946; https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/What-
does-IDF-closing-Black-Friday-war-crimes-probe-mean-for-ICC-565150.  
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UN Commission of Inquiry implies that the very limited scope of Israeli 
investigations covering the 2014 Gaza conflict is no coincidence, noting 
that “[in many cases, individual soldiers may have been following 
agreed military policy, but it is the policy itself that may violate the laws 
of war”.84  
  
The existence of investigatory activity which appears to focus solely on 
low-level perpetrators is a common challenge in situations under the 
ICC’s scrutiny, including in situations involving States with significant 
resources and sophisticated legal systems.85 However, because the scope 
and outcome of such proceedings is surrounded by a level of uncertainty, 
they may work to complicate and delay the Prosecutor’s 
complementarity assessment.86 Yet, the Prosecutor demonstrated in the 
                                               
84 See Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry 
established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1, supra note 73, §§ 
640-41 (further noting that Israeli investigations focus “on so-called ‘exceptional 
incidents’ suggesting a rather narrow approach, which may fail to take into account 
violations of international law that result from an intentional policy or military 
command, which itself may fail to comply with international legal obligations […] In 
the latest round of violence, no action is known to have been taken by the MAG, in 
the case of military commanders, and by the Attorney General, with respect to 
military and civilian leadership, to initiate investigations into the role of senior 
officials.” The report by Israel’s State Comptroller also points to a range of flaws 
relating to inquiries into the decision-making process and military action in Gaza in 
2014. See 2018 report by State Comptroller, supra note 75. 
85 By way of example, in the situation in Afghanistan, the Prosecutor observes:  
Although the US has asserted that it has conducted thousands of investigations into 
detainee abuse, to the extent discernible, such investigations and/or prosecutions 
appear to have focused on alleged acts committed by direct physical perpetrators 
and/or their immediate superiors. None of the investigations appear to have 
examined the criminal responsibility of those who developed, authorised or bore 
oversight responsibility for the implementation by members of the US armed forces 
of the interrogation techniques that resulted in the alleged commission of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
See OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017 supra note 1, § 268. 
Similarly, investigatory activity in the UK relating to the Iraq allegations has so 
far focused only on direct physical perpetrators, as opposed to the possible 
liability of commanders and decision-makers who were reportedly responsible for 
creating or sustaining a system and culture that permitted regular abuse of 
detainees. See also Thomas Obel Hansen, supra note 8 (‘Accountability for 
British War Crimes in Iraq?’ paper), at 423-24. 
86 See also Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (May 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/03/pressure-point-iccs-
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Afghanistan probe that the Office is ultimately prepared to request the 
opening of a full investigation in situations where long-lasting domestic 
accountability measures focus only on direct physical perpetrators.87  
 
4.3. ‘Ability’ and ‘willingness’? 
 
Should the ICC Prosecutor conclude that there is not a ‘situation of 
inactivity’, her Office will proceed to the second step of the 
complementarity assessment involving an assessment of whether the 
relevant State is able and willing to investigate and prosecute the crimes.  
 
The Prosecutor’s assessment of ability at the preliminary examination 
stage entails an analysis of “whether, due to a total or substantial 
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is 
unable to collect the necessary evidence and testimony, unable to obtain 
the accused, or is otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”88 As 
noted above, it is not particularly likely that the Prosecutor will observe 
that Israel’s legal system is altogether unable to conduct investigations 
and proceedings even with respect to complex international crimes. 
However, the question of ability will require particular attention with 
respect to crimes falling under the jurisdiction of Palestinian authorities, 
especially in light of their own admission that “its failure to open 
investigations results from insufficient means to carry out investigations 
in a territory over which it has yet to re-establish unified control”.89 This 
                                               
impact-national-justice/lessons-colombia-georgia-guinea-and [hereinafter ‘HRW 
pressure point’) (noting at 12 that there is a risk that “domestic authorities producing 
a certain amount of activity – opening of case files and limited investigative steps – 
to stave off ICC intervention, but without following through with prosecutions”). 
87 See ‘OTP Afghanistan investigation request’, supra note 57. 
88 In conducting this evaluation, the Office considers, inter alia, “the ability of the 
competent authorities to exercise their judicial powers in the territory concerned; the 
absence of conditions of security for witnesses, investigators, prosecutors and judges 
or the lack of adequate protection systems; the absence of the required legislative 
framework to prosecute the same conduct or forms of responsibility; the lack of 
adequate resources for effective investigations and prosecutions; as well as violations 
of fundamental rights of the accused”. See OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations, supra note 2, §§ 56-57. 
89 As cited in Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry 
Established Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-
21/1A/HRC/29/52 (24 June 2015) § 73. 
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could easily lead the Prosecutor to conclude that cases relating to alleged 
crimes by Palestinian armed groups are admissible since Palestine is 
unable to investigate.90 However, as explained below in this Article, an 
argument can be made that the Prosecutor’s approach to positive 
complementarity must at least partially depend on whether the 
concerned State is deemed to be unable or unwilling to prosecute. 
 
The Prosecutor’s assessment of unwillingness to investigate or 
prosecute at the preliminary examination stage involves an analysis of 
the standards mentioned in Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute, including 
whether:  
 
(a) the proceedings were or are being undertaken for the purpose of shielding 
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the ICC 
jurisdiction, (b) there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which 
in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice, and (c) the proceedings were or are not conducted 
independently or impartially and in a manner consistent with an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice.91  
 
As this partly overlaps with the standards that are assessed under 
‘activity’, we will focus here on the issue of “unjustified delay in the 
proceedings”. In that regard it is noteworthy that the Office’s Policy 
Paper on Preliminary Examinations observes that delays in national 
proceedings may be assessed in light of indicators “such as, the pace of 
investigative steps and proceedings; whether the delay in the 
proceedings can be objectively justified in the circumstances; and 
whether there is evidence of a lack of intent to bring the person(s) 
                                               
90 It may be however that the Prosecutor will also – or instead – conclude that Palestine 
is unwilling to investigate and prosecute the crimes. In this regard, it is worth noting 
that the UN Commission of Inquiry concluded that:  
[I]nvestigations by Palestinian authorities are woefully inadequate, despite 
allegations of violations of international humanitarian law by Palestinian 
actors, leaving Israeli victims without an effective remedy. With respect to 
the local authorities in Gaza, no steps appear to have been taken to ensure 
effective investigations into actions by Palestinian armed groups, seemingly 
owing to a lack of political will.  
Id. 
91 For a description of the factors taken into account in this regard, see OTP Policy 
Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, §§ 50-54. 
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concerned to justice”.92 Suggesting that the intention of national 
authorities is key, in some situations the Office has stated that it would 
accept a (not specified) “reasonable delay” in national proceedings, 
noting that the fight against impunity “appear to remain a priority” of 
the relevant national authorities”.93  
 
Given the time that has passed since the incidents in Gaza under 
preliminary examination occurred, the question of whether there has 
been an ‘unjustified delay’ with respect to taking forward the 
investigation of these crimes will arise in the Prosecutor’s assessment of 
willingness. Israeli authorities point to the complexity of its 
investigations into crimes in Gaza as a factor impacting their duration.94 
This is ‘common practice’, and this aspect of the complementarity 
assessment has presented significant challenges for advancing 
accountability in situations involving States with significant resources. 
Such States may be able to demonstrate that investigations into the 
conduct of their armed forces are on-going, and claim that these take a 
long time to complete due to their complexity, but they ultimately lead 
to no or very limited accountability. In the UK, for example, more than 
ten years after the alleged crimes took place in Iraq, investigations are 
said to be still ongoing, but there is little to suggest their continuation 
will bring about any meaningful accountability.95 This brings into 
question whether the ICC Prosecutor would benefit from establishing 
deadlines for its conclusion of the complementarity assessment at the 
preliminary examination stage.   
 
As in other cases involving global and regional power, the main 
challenge for making complementarity work with respect to crimes 
allegedly committed by Israel is thus not ‘ability’ but ‘willingness’. As 
                                               
92 Id. § 52. 
93 The remarks were made in the Guinea examination. See OTP Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, supra note 1, § 271.  
94 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that “[o]ngoing examinations and 
investigations take time, due to, amongst other things, the complexity of the issues, 
the challenges in investigating these types of incidents […], and the need to 
coordinate testimony from third parties”. See Israel’s Investigation of Alleged 
Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, MINISTRY OF FOR. AFF. (14 June 2015), § 
457, http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/IsraelInvestigations.pdf.  
95 See generally Thomas Obel Hansen, supra note 8. 
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follows from the analysis above, the framework for assessing 
complementarity during preliminary examinations presents a range of 
obstacles for advancing accountability, in particular in situations where 
there is prolonged domestic investigatory activity. As will be discussed 
below, this brings into question the merits of endorsing a policy 
objective of positive complementarity in such situations. 
 
5. Positive complementarity – an asset or obstacle to accountability 
for crimes in Palestine?  
 
5.1. Preliminary examinations, positive complementarity and State 
power 
 
The principle of complementarity has often been pointed to as the 
cornerstone of the Rome Statute.96 The principle is usually perceived of 
as something inherently ‘good’, because it respects State sovereignty 
and thereby is thought to encourage State ratification;97 because it 
encourages the Court to use its limited resources wisely and focus on 
crimes that would otherwise be left unaddressed;98 because it facilitates 
norm transmission and ultimately promotes accountability as the 
principle is thought to create a “strong incentive for national 
implementation”,99 or because it can “serve as a catalyst through which 
States Parties are induced to comply with their obligation to investigate 
and prosecute ICC crimes.”100 
                                               
96 See, e.g., Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International 
Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the 
Fight against Impunity (2003) 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 591, 593; Jonathan I. 
Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts (2001) 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 120; Eve La Haye, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court: Controversies over the Preconditions for Exercising Its Jurisdiction (1999) 46 
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1.  
97 See, e.g,. F. Mégret, Why Would States Want to Join the ICC? A Theoretical 
Exploration Based on the Legal Nature of Complementarity, in COMPLEMENTARY 
VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY (J. Kleffner and G. Kor eds., 2006).    
98 See e.g. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 351 (OUP, 2003). 
99 See e.g. Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1(1) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
J 86 (2003). 
100 See e.g. Christine Bjork and Juanita Goebertus, Complementarity in Action: The 
Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE 
HUM. RTS. AND DEV. J. 211 (2011).  
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With respect to the latter argument, often referred to as a question of 
‘positive complementarity’,101 international criminal law scholarship 
tends to assume that the potential for this to occur is greatest at the 
preliminary examinations stage. The expectation typically is that once 
the ICC Prosecutor opens a preliminary examination, the threat that the 
Office will proceed to a full investigation will add sufficient pressure on 
the State in question for it to commence its own proceedings, even if 
there may be important contradicting national interests. The prevailing 
view seems to be that the anticipated reaction from a State under 
preliminary examination is that it will “aggressively and fairly pursue 
domestic prosecutions of international crimes so as not to trigger the 
jurisdiction of the ICC over the case and invite the glare of the eyes of 
the international community upon it”.102 The argument often is that 
preliminary examinations present a powerful policy instrument of the 
ICC Prosecutor because they “entail a high degree of ‘soft power’ due 
to the large degree of prosecutorial discretion, the indeterminacy of the 
decision-making process and the strong expressive dimensions of ICC 
action”.103 ICC prosecutors have similarly made far-reaching claims 
concerning the importance of positive complementarity, sometimes 
implying that the ultimate goal of advancing accountability for 
international crimes is best achieved by encouraging national authorities 
to prosecute such crimes in their own. ICC Prosecutor Bensouda argues 
that the preliminary examination phase “is one of the most remarkable 
                                               
101 The policy paper on preliminary examinations uses the term ‘positive 
complementarity’ to refer to a situation where national judicial authorities and the 
ICC “function together” to create an “interdependent, mutually reinforcing 
international system of justice”.) See OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations, supra note 2, § 100. 
102 The prevailing view is summarized by Bjork and Goebertus, supra note 100, at 
208. For examples of such expectations to positive complementarity, see e.g. William 
Burke-White, Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome 
System of Justice 19(1) CRIM. L. FORUM (2008) 59 (noting at 62 that “the overall goal 
of the Rome Statute—ending impunity—may be best achieved through […] 
encouragement of national prosecutions”); David Bosco, The International Criminal 
Court and Crime Prevention: Byproduct or Conscious 19 MICH. ST. J. OF INT’L L. 
(2011) 163 (noting at 181 that preliminary examinations can serve as an effective 
means of catalyzing political will toward prosecution in situations under analysis as 
they create pressure for national judicial proceedings and the possible incarceration 
of those responsible for crimes). 
103 See Carsten Stahn, supra note 22 , at 416.  
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efficiency tools we have at our disposal as it encourages national 
prosecutions and prevents or puts an end to abuses”, allowing the Court 
“to avoid opening investigations and prosecutions when national 
mechanisms are functioning in accordance with our founding 
Statute”.104 The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations states that 
one of the overall goals of preliminary examinations involves the 
“ending of impunity, by encouraging genuine national proceedings”105 
– a goal sometimes referred to in the Paper as “ending impunity through 
positive complementarity”.106 The Paper emphasizes that “a significant 
part of the Office’s efforts at the preliminary examination stage is 
directed towards encouraging States to carry out their primary 
responsibility to investigate and prosecute international crimes”.107 In 
practice, the ICC Prosecutor has often been deferential to national 
proceedings, avoiding to make a final conclusion on complementarity 
as part of the admissibility assessment, in order to promote positive 
complementarity.108 
 
This begs the question whether the ICC Prosecutor will decide to 
proceed with an investigation in the Palestine situation in the near future 
if it deems that the legal requirements to complementarity are currently 
not satisfied, or if the Office will ‘wait it out’ in the hope that positive 
complementarity will ultimately work.  
                                               
104 Fatou Bensouda, Reflections from the International Criminal Court Prosecutor 
45(1) CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT’L L. (2012) 505; 508–09 (further noting at 507 
that that positive complementarity implies “a proactive policy of cooperation and 
consultation, aimed at promoting national proceedings and at positioning itself as a 
sword of Damocles, ready to intervene in the event of unwillingness or inability by 
national authorities”). Former Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo infamously stated: 
as “a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court 
should not be a measure of its efficiency […] on the contrary, the absence of trials 
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, 
would be a major success”. Moreno-Ocampo as cited in Geoff Dancy and Florencia 
Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why International Criminal Court 
Investigations Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 
(2017) 689. 
105 OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 2, § 93. 
106 Id., § 100. 
107 Id. 
108 See similarly David Bosco, supra note 33 (noting that the Prosecutor has been 
“very deferential to national proceedings (even ones fraught with problems) in places 
like Colombia, Georgia, and Russia”). 
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5.2. Why positive complementarity is unlikely to work in the Palestine 
situation 
 
Despite optimism among ICC prosecutors and many scholars alike 
concerning the capacity of preliminary examinations to galvanize 
domestic accountability processes, there is surprisingly little empirical 
evidence that ICC preliminary examinations actually ‘trigger’ genuine 
domestic accountability processes.109 In fact, the limited empirical 
research that does exist on the topic often challenges – and sometimes 
even contradicts – the assumption made by prosecutors that preliminary 
examinations, through positive complementarity, present the most 
significant tool for advancing accountability.110 Importantly, none of the 
preliminary examinations that have been closed to date were terminated 
on the basis of an admissibility assessment that domestic processes 
rendered further ICC action unjustified.111 
 
Challenges to making positive complementarity work are likely to be 
particularly pronounced in situations involving States with significant 
resources because they are better placed to manage or counter the ICC’s 
‘soft power’, or simply because they feel they have less to fear from the 
ICC.112 For example, nothing suggests that ICC activity with respect to 
                                               
109  As noted by Dancy and Montal, “little systematic research to date has focused on 
the relationship between ICC involvement and domestic proceedings”. See Dancy 
and Montal, supra note 104, at 8. See also Paul Seils, Making complementarity work: 
Maximizing the limited role of the Prosecutor’, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (C. Stahn and M.M. El 
Zeidy eds., 2011) 989 (noting at 1012 that whereas publicizing a situation under 
preliminary examination may well have a “catalytic influence”, “to date there is no 
proof of it having made a difference”). 
110 See e.g. Dancy and Montal, supra note 104. 
111 See further Thomas Obel Hansen, The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations: 
Ending Impunity through ‘Positive Complementarity’? (working paper), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939139.  
112 See however Carsten Stahn, supra note 22, at 424 (noting that: “Existing 
experiences show that ICC engagement has promoted complementarity in countries 
with a strong rule of law culture. It has been less effective in fragile environments. 
Domestic political elites may use ICC engagement as a means to advancing their own 
political agendas”). In the view of this author, there is no reason to assume that 
political elites in more resourceful States will be less inclined to instrumentalize ICC 
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the U.S. activities in Afghanistan has prompted U.S authorities to take 
more seriously their obligations to prosecute torture and other 
international crimes. Following a 10-year preliminary examination of 
the situation in Afghanistan, in November 2017 the Prosecutor finally 
decided to request the Chamber’s authorization of the opening of an 
investigation, noting that “no national investigations or prosecutions 
have been conducted or are ongoing against those who appear most 
responsible” for the crimes allegedly committed by members of the U.S. 
armed forces and the CIA.113 Similarly, the ICC Prosecutor sought and 
obtained permission to open an investigation into the situation in 
Georgia on the basis that no relevant domestic proceedings had been 
opened in Russia.114 The ICC’s preliminary examination of the situation 
in Iraq, involving allegations against British forces, also does not appear 
to have advanced accountability at the domestic level. Despite 
assurances by British authorities that they take accountability seriously 
and their submission that the ICC’s preliminary examination should be 
terminated (in part) on grounds of complementarity, there is little 
suggestion that this has been – or will prove to be – an example of 
positive complementarity ‘working’.115 In 2017 the government closed 
IHAT, the investigative body tasked with looking into Iraq claims and 
                                               
processes, and there appears to be no concrete examples of positive complementarity 
‘working’ in such States.  
113 Public Redacted Version of “Request for Authorisation of an Investigation 
Pursuant to Article 15”, INT’L CRIM. CT. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, 20 November 
2017, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, ICC-02/17-7-Red.20 November 2017 §§ 299; 312. 
The Prosecutor noted that the complementarity assessment was complicated by the 
fact that US authorities did not engage her Office. 
114 The Prosecutor determined that, “despite a number of reported verification efforts, 
no concrete and progressive steps have been taken in Russia to ascertain the criminal 
responsibility of those involved in the alleged crimes related to the potential case(s) 
identified in the Request.” OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015 
§ 256.  
115 The British government has made it clear that it believes the preliminary 
examination should be closed, on three grounds: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction since 
the crimes were not committed on a large scale; (2) due to the existence of judicial 
measures in the UK which address crimes in Iraq, the Rome Statute’s 
complementarity regime renders the situation inadmissible; and (3) the information 
that the preliminary examination is based on is not credible. See further Thomas Obel 
Hansen, supra note 8. 
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fulfilling Britain’s obligations under the complementarity regime.116 
Further frustrating the process of seeking accountability for crimes in 
Iraq, the British government targeted the lawyers involved in the 
accountability processes and have made broader moves aimed at 
avoiding a repeat of the legal processes that have emerged in this case, 
including a proposal to derogate from human rights law so that it no 
longer applies to situations of armed conflict.117  
 
This suggests that mainstream assumptions concerning the value of 
preliminary examinations for positive complementarity may well be 
overstated, in particular in situations involving global and regional 
powers which perceive that they have strong political interests in 
avoiding legal scrutiny of their armed and security forces – and more 
broadly their legal and policy security framework.  
 
The particular circumstances surrounding the Palestine examination 
makes it unlikely that this situation should be different in terms of the 
ICC’s ability to ‘push’ the authorities of global and regional powers into 
conducting genuine proceedings against the persons allegedly 
responsible for the crimes under ICC examination. This is most clearly 
the case concerning Israeli settlement activities. Since these are 
authorized by the State and any investigation would automatically lead 
to the senior most leadership, it is virtually impossible to imagine that 
the ICC process has the capacity to bring about a genuine domestic legal 
process, regardless of the stigma associated with ICC intervention and 
regardless what action the Prosecutor might take in the name of positive 
                                               
116 IHAT was replaced by a smaller team of service police investigators, criticized by 
human rights organizations for lacking any semblance of an independent 
investigation. See id.  
117 See also id. See similarly HRW pressure point, supra note 86, (noting at 7 that 
Human Rights Watch research “indicates that the ICC’s involvement so far has not 
per se instigated or influenced national proceedings in significant ways”).  
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complementarity. 118 In short, no soft – or hard – power will make Israel 
pursue state-sanctioned settlement activities as a crime.119  
 
This should lead the ICC Prosecutor to abandon any expectation of 
positive complementarity, at least with regard to these aspects of the 
Palestine examination. Should the Office find that other Statutory 
requirements for an investigation are satisfied, there are therefore few 
reasons to delay it in the hope that ICC soft power will convince Israeli 
authorities to commence a criminal justice process which would 
contradict official State policy and target the country’s own leadership. 
With respect to the aspects of the examination that concerns war crimes 
during the 2014 conflict in Gaza, it is conceivable – but not particularly 
likely – that perceptions concerning the prospects of an ICC 
investigation and potential indictments could change the nature and 
scope of domestic investigations. The political costs of pursuing military 
commanders means that the cost-benefit analysis is unlikely to change, 
regardless of how real the prospects of an ICC investigation is.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
ICC activities are increasingly focusing on the conduct of global and 
regional powers. This presents a significant change in international 
justice. Yet, for now only one investigation (Georgia) has been opened 
which targets a global or regional power (Russia), and no arrest warrants 
                                               
118 On the stigma associated with ICC intervention, see further Carsten Stahn, supra 
note 22 (observing, inter alia, that preliminary examinations “have a strong 
expressivist dimension […] They express harm and gravity of alleged violations and 
set important signals about the type of atrocity situations that international criminal 
justice cares about”; further noting that one of most important functions of 
preliminary examinations “lies in their social disapproval of a particular form of 
behaviour, and their impact on accountability discourse”; and that “[s]pecific 
findings in a preliminary examination or the mere absence of closure may entail 
certain stigmas or associations that states, governments or affected entities are keen 
to avoid”).  
119 On the general challenges to positive complementarity in situations where there is 
no or only very limited political will domestically for accountability, see HRW 
pressure point, supra note 86 (noting at 9: “The extent of opposition to accountability 
by powerful interests in the country will constrain the OTP’s influence. The lack of 
full political support for accountability—regardless of stated intention by 
governments—was a constant across” the case studies examined by Human Rights 
Watch). 
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have been issued or trials commenced against any citizen of a global or 
regional power to date.  
 
Whereas there are multiple reasons for the difficulties associated with 
advancing accountability for crimes by global and regional powers, this 
Article has pointed to challenges posed by the ICC’s complementarity 
framework. States with significant resources and sophisticated legal 
systems have unique opportunities to utilize these to halt quick 
progression of ICC activity. For example, as appears to be the case with 
respect to Israeli inquiries into crimes during the 2014 Gaza conflict, 
they may initiate investigatory activity that delays and complicates the 
ICC Prosecutor’s assessment, but which is not intended to bring about 
accountability for those most responsible for the crimes. Even when they 
do not, as is the case with Israeli settlements, the policy framework of 
positive complementarity, endorsed by ICC prosecutors and many 
commentators alike, may serve to delay the pursuit of accountability.   
 
Expectations to positive complementarity ought to be low in situations 
where the legal assessment of complementarity points to inactivity 
following a sustained period of time, or when identified accountability 
processes only pursue a limited number of direct physical perpetrators 
or for other reasons suggest lack of political will to advance 
accountability domestically. In situations where it is asserted that a 
global or regional power has proven over a sustained period of time that 
it is unwilling to investigate and prosecute those most responsible for 
crimes under ICC examination – as is the case with Israel’s settlement 
activities and crimes committed in the 2014 Gaza conflict – there is little 
merit in pursuing a policy objective of positive complementarity in the 
face of State opposition, or even hostility, to accountability. If anything, 
States with significant resources and sophisticated legal systems ought 
to be held to more rigorous standards than States which for reasons of 
limited capacity may experience challenges giving effect to 
accountability norms. So far, most ICC investigations have focused on 
the latter category.  
 
Despite the challenges pointed to, the ICC’s intervention in Palestine 
does present an opportunity to advance accountability norms for 
violations of international law in the country, including Israel’s 
settlement activities and violations reported to be committed by both 
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parties to the 2014 Gaza conflict. Even if accountability for crimes in 
Palestine may not happen in any near future, the ICC’s intervention is 
important because it impacts the behavior of actors in the conflict and 
disseminates particular narratives of the violations, the actors 
responsible, and the conflict more broadly. In a sense, the Prosecutor’s 
decision to focus on certain crimes – including Israeli settlement 
activities – ‘elevates’ public perceptions of the seriousness of the 
behavior in question and makes it subject to additional international 
scrutiny and potentially condemnation. In particular, the symbolic and 
practical importance of potentially adjudicating settlement as a war 
crime under the Rome Statute should not be underestimated. Even if the 
Palestine examination may not progress quickly, as long as it remains 
open it will continue to have significant legitimacy costs for Israel.  
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Annex - Overview of ICC activity relating to global and regional 
powers  
 
à Progress of ICC activity 
 Israel 
(Palestine) 
 
Russia 
(Ukraine) 
UK (Iraq) US 
(Afghanistan) 
Russia 
(Georgia)  
Statu
s of 
PE/ 
inv 
 
PE announced 
re-opened in 
2015 after initial 
closure in 2012 / 
PE currently in 
phase 2 
PE announced 
opened in 2014 / 
PE currently in 
phase 2 
PE announced 
re-opened in 
2014 after initial 
closure in 2006 / 
PE currently in 
phase 3 
 
PE announced 
opened in 2007 / 
OTP req. to open 
inv. submitted in 
Nov 2017 (yet to 
be decided) 
PE announced 
opened in 
2008 / Inv. 
opened in Oct 
2015 (no trials 
or arrest to 
date) 
 
Legal 
basis 
for 
PE/ 
inv  
 
Art 12(3) decl. 
by Palestine + 
Palestine 
referral 
(Palestine State 
Party) 
 
Art 12(3) decl. 
by Ukraine 
Proprio motu 
(UK State Party) 
 
 
Proprio motu 
(Afghanistan 
State Party) 
 
 
Proprio motu 
(Georgia State 
Party) 
 
Actor
s 
unde
r ICC 
scruti
ny 
 
1) Israeli 
authorities (re 
settlements); 2) 
Israeli armed 
forces (re Gaza); 
3) Palestinian 
armed groups (re 
Gaza) 
1) ‘Self-defense 
militia’/ ‘anti-
government 
armed group’s; 
2) Russian 
armed forces; 3) 
Russian 
authorities; 4) de 
facto Crimean 
authorities; 5) 
pro-Ukrainian 
forces 
 
1) UK armed 
forces (war 
crimes during 
Iraq war and 
occupation 
(2003-08)) 
 
1) Taliban; 2) 
Afghan security 
forces, 3) US 
armed forces 
and CIA (war 
crimes of 
torture) 
Armed forces 
of: 1) Georgia, 
2) South 
Ossetia, and 3) 
Russia 
 
Com
plem
entar
ity 
asses
smen
t 
No PE 
complementarit
y assessment yet 
/ 
complementarit
y could pose 
obstacle to 
opening of inv re 
Israeli crimes in 
Gaza; unlikely 
No PE 
complementarit
y assessment yet 
/ unclear if 
complementarit
y could pose 
obstacle to 
opening of inv 
PE 
complementarit
y assessment 
commenced/ 
complementarit
y could pose 
obstacle to 
opening of inv 
PE 
complementarit
y assessment 
completed/ 
complementarit
y unlikely to 
pose obstacle to 
opening of inv 
but new info 
may be taken 
PE 
complementari
ty assessment 
completed/ 
complementari
ty could pose 
obstacle re 
Russia but 
unlikely re 
Georgia 
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re settlements 
and Palestinian 
armed groups 
into account at a 
later stage 
Gove
rnme
nt 
respo
nse 
(by 
main 
powe
r) 
 
Shifting 
(aggressive to 
conciliatory)/ 
engaging: 
•Some 
engagement 
with Court 
•Active steps to 
undermine 
accountability: 
a) efforts to 
prevent 
Palestine from 
joining ICC; b) 
states will 
“dismantle this 
court” 
•Rejects 
legitimacy of 
ICC process on 
basis that Court 
is political / 
“anti-Israeli”  
Aggressive / not 
engaging: 
•No engagement 
with Court  
•Active steps to 
undermine 
accountability: 
withdrew 
signature to ICC 
Statute in 2016 
•Rejects 
legitimacy of 
ICC process on 
basis that Court 
is political 
Measured / 
engaging:  
•Extensive 
engagement 
with Court 
•Active steps to 
undermine 
accountability: 
1) targeting of 
involved 
lawyers; 2) 
broader moves 
to avoid 
repetition of 
legal process 
•Rejects 
legitimacy of 
ICC process on 
basis that: a) 
allegations not 
credible; b) ICC 
lacks 
jurisdiction); c) 
complementarit
y 
 
Measured / not 
engaging:  
•No (official) 
engagement 
with Court  
• No active steps 
to date to 
undermine 
accountability 
•Rejects 
legitimacy of 
ICC process on 
basis that ICC 
does not have 
jurisdiction over 
US citizens 
 
[see Russia 
response under 
‘Ukraine 
examination’] 
 
 
